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In his essay ‘Eye and Mind’ Mikel Dufrenne suggests that there is an
oculocentric bias within Merleau-Ponty’s work, not least in his writ-
ings on aesthetics.1 Of Merleau-Ponty’s famous last essay, Eye and
Mind,2 he writes: “In the end, there is still a final question concern-
ing the title: eye, of course, but why not ear or hand for that matter?”3
Doubtless, something like an oculocentric bias could be shown to sub-
tendMerleau-Ponty’swork. Oneneedonly recall the titles of his books
and articles, or list the artists that feature in them. But how are we to
understand this dynamic?
Dufrenne, I think, is right not only to recognise that in Eye and
Mind Merleau-Ponty “wanted to bestow a radical privilege to the vi-
sual,”4 granting it some level of intended significance, but also in the
way he recognises this, emphasising that Merleau-Ponty’s position
seems to mark out a discontinuity between his early and mature
works. He writes:
We have found in Merleau-Ponty the idea of a primitive
Logos, as system of equivalences between elements of the
1Dufrenne 1993, p. 261.
2Merleau-Ponty 1993a, from now on abbreviated to (EM).
3Dufrenne 1993, p. 261.
4Ibid., p. 261.
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visible. But this system of equivalences is also constituted
between diverse sensorial registers, as Phenomenology of
Perception has already indicated. Synaesthesias are the lot
of all perception. […] In order to remain close to this sav-
age Logos, shouldMerleau-Ponty have written “the sensu-
ous and mind”? In any case, what [Merleau-Ponty] says
about the visible can also be said of the sonorous and the
tactile.5
As Dufrenne explains in the passage above, in Merleau-Ponty’s
early thought, particularly that of Phenomenology of Perception, an
undermining of sight’s privilege already seems to be at work. What
we find in Phenomenology of Perception, then, is an account of lived
or embodied perception that seeks to address the phenomenon of
synaesthesia—a bleeding of the senses into one register, or one body.
Crucially, this “integrated core”6 is seen by Merleau-Ponty as ontolog-
ically prior to the ‘scientific’ characterisation of the senses as discrete
(in the mathematical sense) heterogeneous zones. “Synesthetic per-
ception,” writes Merleau-Ponty, “is the rule, and we are unaware of it
only because scientific knowledge shifts the centre of gravity of expe-
rience, so that we have unlearned how to see [ . . . ] in order to deduce
[ . . . ] what we are to see.”7 In light of this, and in the final analysis,
Dufrenne can only provide us with a speculative response to his origi-
nal concern, writing, “Iwouldwillingly say that ifMerleau-Ponty chose
to write ‘eye’ and ‘mind,’ it is simply because he loved painting.”8
Beyond this, and by placing Merleau-Ponty’s work in its histori-
cal context, this apparent fidelity to the visual is complicated even
further. Heidegger showed, as early as 1927 in Being and Time, that
since Parmenides the Western tradition has been “oriented primarily
towards ‘seeing’ as a way of access to entities and to Being.”9 Critically,
and by extension of this analysis, Heidegger also implicates Husser-
5Ibid., p. 261.
6Merleau-Ponty 2007, p. 26.
7Ibid., p. 266.
8Dufrenne 1993, p. 261.
9Heidegger 1962, pp. 147/187,171/215.
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lian phenomenology within that trajectory: within, that is, the ‘meta-
physics of presence.’ He writes; “the thesis that all cognition has ‘intu-
ition’ as its goal, has the temporalmeaning that all cognizing ismaking
present.”10Which is to say, forHusserl—andphilosophers of conscious-
nessmore broadly—the meaning of Being is still determined through
the Greek notion of οὐσία (ousia, ‘constance in presence’),11 and its
correlative mode of access, sight. In light of this, and as part of any
task of finding a philosophical basis to the “exorbitant privilege that
[Merleau-Ponty] granted to vision,”12 one must also address the place,
the significance, and the provenance of the ocular as it features in phi-
losophy itself.
In a certain respect, in this paper I do no more than mimic Dufrenne
by following his original concern and trying to offer a response to it.
However, in terms of approachmy thesis is markedly different. Whilst
I agree with Dufrenne’s emphasis on finding a philosophical basis of
Merleau-Ponty’s ‘ocularcentric bias,’ I think that his reading threat-
ens to overlook the singular significance of the ocular as it features in
the essay Eye and Mind. In contrast, then, my thesis is not retrospec-
tive but prospective: my concern is not to address the (dis)continuity
of Merleau-Ponty’s thought, by showing that what Eye and Mind says
about the visible can also be said of the sonorous and the tactile, since
it is linked to them. Neither is it to provide a developmental account
of Merleau-Ponty’s thought and its relation to the visible. Instead, I
seek to show that in Eye and Mind vision and painting are intention-
ally privileged—or rather, specifically addressed—for very particular,
philosophical reasons.
So far as I understand it, in Eye and Mind, Merleau-Ponty is re-
sponding to one of the central philosophical problems of modernity:
10Heidegger 1962, pp. 363n/498n xxiii.
11Sinclair 2007, p. 33.
12Dastur 1988, p. 18.
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how the attempt to think the essence of transcendence issued into
an objectification of both thought and experience. How, that is, mod-
ern philosophy has sought to determine our relation to the world (our
very being-in-the-world) via the subordination of aisthesis to noesis
(‘eye’ to ‘mind’). Within this framework I want to show that vision
and painting are discussed for two reasons. First, that the philosophy
of reflection—specificallywithDescartes—took “inspiration from the
perspectival techniques of the Renaissance” (EM, p. 135) in accom-
plishing this subordination. Second, that by doing this, he was then
able to reconstruct “the visible according to a model in thought” (EM,
p. 130), able, that is, to give an account of transcendence that was
grounded in the spontaneity of themind.
To state it more formally, in this paper I shall read Merleau-Ponty
as suggesting that with Descartes, modern philosophy comes about
through an engagement with the ocular—in an attempt to think its
peculiar virtue of “action at a distance” (EM, p. 131)—but, in the final
analysis, forgets this dynamic when it submits aisthesis to the regime
of noesis (that is, ‘eye’ to ‘mind’), thereby occluding its own historical
foundation from itself. In this sense—and providing my assessment
of the situation is correct—I claim that Eye and Mind is genealogical
in intent. It is because Dufrenne overlooks this dynamic that he is un-
able to reconcile Merleau-Ponty’s earlier thought with the particular
foregrounding of vision and painting that we find in Eye andMind.
An upshot of this is a better understanding ofMerleau-Ponty’s late
text Eye and Mind, specifically in its relation to his earlier work—
in particular the Phenomenology of Perception. Though I approach
this problem through Dufrenne’s short essay ‘Eye and Mind,’ the mo-
tivation, framing, and subsequent conclusions of this reading are
by no means isolated.13 By reading Eye and Mind positively—i.e.
as expounding a positive philosophical position that jars with his
earlier thought—Dufrenne does not offers us a critical perspective
on how this late text re-appropriates the central problem of the
Phenomenology of Perception—the relation of consciousness to the
world—genealogically. Genealogy is an explicitly philosophical re-
13See Matthews 2002, p. 148 and Gilmore 2006, p.292.
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sponse to the mind–body problem. To believe that this problem can
be solved in thought alone is itself the consequence of the separation
of mind and body. In a similar manner to Dufrenne, Eric Matthews
writes that inEyeandMind “‘painting’ is called forth byMerleau-Ponty
because it is the paradigm case of a relation to Being that is different
to that of [Descartes].” Though not entirely inaccurate, Matthews also
reads Eye and Mind positively, such that one can only see Merleau-
Ponty’s relation to painting as a productive or pragmatic move; one
that helps him to articulate a space, or opening, which exists outside
of the Cartesian paradigm.
Both of these readings are ‘positivistic’ in the sense that they fail
to see that, and consequently how, Eye and Mind is an attempt to
lead modern philosophy back to its own presuppositions in prepara-
tion for a transformation, a historical self-overcoming. For me, the
turn to painting in Eye and Mind is not intended to provide a re-
gional ontology—a simple, yet constructive, description of the aes-
thetic experience—but rather offers a return to the technical and con-
ceptual horizon at the inception of modern philosophy. I want to sug-
gest that the privilege of the ocular in Eye and Mind can only be ade-
quately understood in its ambiguous relation to Merleau-Ponty’s ear-
lierwork ifweunderstand it as a leading-back, as a re-ductionof the in-
ception ofmodern philosophy to its ownnonexplicit pre-suppositions.
I hope to show, with Francois Dastur, that Merleau-Ponty “while re-
maining the inheritor of the tradition” puts into question fromwithin,
“the nonexplicit presuppositions on which the tradition is founded”.14
1 Perspectiva Artificialis
In this section I want to address Merleau-Ponty’s claim that
Descartes took “inspiration from the perspectival techniques of the
Renaissance” (EM, p. 135)—from, that is, the technical practice of per-
spectiva artificialis. As Merleau-Ponty seeks to show, Descartes took
this technique as being absolute—as offering an unimpeachable in-
sight into the nature of the visible—and, consequently, offered us a
14Dastur 1988, p. 40.
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theoretical reconstruction of the visible that was based on its laws.
What we need to understand, therefore, is not just how this techni-
cal operation functioned, but how it allowed for, andmade possible, a
certain determination of aisthesis (and its relation to noesis) that was
then carried over by Descartes into his ontology.
[The artist] sees the tree nearby, then he directs his gaze
further into the distance, to the road, before finally look-
ing to the horizon; the apparent dimensions of the other
objects change each time he stares at a different point. On
the canvas, he arranges things such that what he repre-
sents is no more than a compromise between these vari-
ous different visual impressions: he strives to find a com-
mon denominator to all these perceptions by rendering
each object notwith the size, colours and aspect it present
when the painter fixes it in his gaze but rather with the
conventional size and aspect that it would present in a
gaze directed at a particular vanishing point on the hori-
zon.15
In the passage above Merleau-Ponty gives an account of perspec-
tiva artificialis. As he explains, in following this technique the artist
arranges objects on the canvas along lines that run from himself to-
wards a point on the horizon. It is by projecting these lines that he is
able to open the canvas onto a space. However, these lines are not
anchored by the artist’s particular perspective; instead they are as-
similated into a geometrised projection, a perspectiveless position that
embraces them all. As a consequence of this, the space that the can-
vas opens onto is partes extra partes, a space that “remains absolutely
in itself, everywhere equal to itself, homogenous” (EM, p. 137) and
isotropic.
Having opened up this purely objective spatiality, then, the
painter proceeds to arrange objects within it. But, crucially, the space
is considered to be indifferent to the objects organisedwithin it, and in
15Merleau-Ponty 2004, p. 51.
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turn the objects are regarded as indifferent to it; or, as Merleau-Ponty
puts it, for classical painting “the form and content of the world do
not mix.”16 This space is one in which “things have a peaceful look, an
air of respectful decency, which comes of their being held by a gaze
fixed at infinity.”17 Everything is in its place and things do not compete
as rivals before vision, soliciting the eye. This is a space of simultane-
ous objects, apprehended by an absolute observer, who is not involved
with any one of them. In short, it is a vision abstracted from its in-
volvement in the world, a vision that takes place “without a body and
without spatial position”, a vision, “in sum, [ . . . ] of the pure intellect.”18
Through its use of perspectiva artificialis, then, classical painting
comes to “elevate certain properties of beings” (EM, p. 134). In the
first instance it privileges the outline—or rather, the form—of an ob-
ject against that of its colour. The colour of an object is reduced to a
second order, because it does not directly pertain to the geometrical
properties of the entity. Or, to the same point, the form of the object
is privileged because it allows for a “network of relations between ob-
jects, such as would be seen by [ . . . ] a geometer looking over it” (EM,
p. 138). It is the form of an object that allows it to be grasped by per-
spectiva artificialis.
Crucially, asMerleau-Ponty observes, for theRenaissance theoreti-
cians this perspectival methodology was no mere ‘tool’—something
that the painter could deploy should the occasion call for it. Instead,
they sought to make this technique into the principal dynamic of all
painting. Perspective was supposed “to bring an end to painting’s
quest and history, to found once and for all an exact and infallible art
of painting” (EM, p. 135). And if it could do this, it was because it was
seen to be “capable in principle of founding an exact construction”
(EM, p. 135) of the external world. Or, as Merleau-Ponty says else-
where, if perspectiva artificialiswas privileged to this extent, it was be-
cause the Renaissance theoreticians understood its formulas as being
16Merleau-Ponty 2004, p. 38.
17Ibid., p. 40.
18Ibid., p. 41.
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“taught [ . . . ] by Nature herself.”19 Certainly, as Merleau-Ponty allows,
therewas a degree of bad faith in this enthusiasm. Not onlymight it be
maintained that the painters realised through their experience “that
no technique of perspective is an exact solution and that there is no
projection of the existingworldwhich respects it in all aspects and de-
serves to become the fundamental law of painting” (EM, p. 135), but
the discovery of linear perspectivewas pursued along several different
paths: “the Italians took the way of representing the object, but the
Northern painters discovered andworked out the formal technique of
Hochraum, Nahraum and Schrägraum” (EM, p. 135). The idea of per-
spective is, in actuality, more regulative than prescriptive—more the
herald of further possibilities for painting than the final and absolute
solution to its problems. It is this that Descartes forgets.
2 Descartes and Space
When speaking of Descartes’ indebtedness to the Renaissance
theoreticians, Merleau-Ponty demonstrates some reticence, writing:
“Descartes does not say much about painting, and one might think it
unfair on our part tomake somuch of a few pages on engravings” (EM,
p. 132). However, and despite this note of caution, he is clear about
the nature of Descartes’ relationship to the practice of perspectiva ar-
tificialis:20
The very fact that [Descartes] speaks of painting only in
passing is itself significant. Painting for him is not a cen-
tral operation contributing to the definition of our access
to Being; it is a mode or variant of thinking [ . . . ] It is sig-
nificant, too, that when he speaks of pictures [tableaux]
he takes line drawings as typical. (EM, p. 132)
As Merleau-Ponty explains, for Descartes painting bears little or
no ontological power, it merely “causes us to see, without real ob-
19Merleau-Ponty 1993b, p. 84.
20We should note here, that the practice of perspectiva artificialis was historically prior to Descartes,
and in was prevalent when he came to write his major works on natural philosophy. For a detailed
analysis of the dates, regions, and reception of this technique, see Gombrich 1995.
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jects, just as we see in everyday life” (EM, p. 133). In this sense we
can already see how he is in accord with an understanding of paint-
ing that came to be held by the Renaissance theoreticians: bewitched
by its capacity to give us a ‘true account’ of the world, the Renaissance
theoreticians—as I have already intimated—believed thatperspectiva
artificialis had brought about the end of “painting’s quest and history”
(EM, p. 135). Like them, Descartes believed that it was “capable in
principle of founding an exact construction” (EM, p. 135) of the exter-
nalworld, and this iswhy its ‘laws’must be assimilated into his project.
In a certain sense, it should come as no surprise that, as Merleau-
Ponty claims in Eye and Mind, Descartes took “inspiration from the
perspectival techniques of the Renaissance” (EM, p. 138). In the first
of hisMeditations, Descartes had already discounted the reliability of
the senses: attentive scrutiny of my sense perception is, he claimed,
sufficient to show me that the senses deceive, and that I must learn
only to trust in the intellect. The famous example of the apprehen-
sion of the piece of wax shows that sensory properties cannot be con-
sidered to be constitutive of corporeal bodies, because these sensible
attributes can change completely, and yet the identity of the object
that subtends these changes can persist throughout themodifications
and is not itself affected by them. From this, Descartes concludes that:
The nature of matter, or of body considered in general,
does not consist in its being a thing that has hardness or
weight, or colour, or any other sensible property, but sim-
ply its being a thing that has extension in length, breadth,
and depth.21
Here Descartes claims that extension (res extensa), in length,
breadth, and depth, is the essence of corporeal bodies. Thus, in aman-
ner akin to the Renaissance theoreticians, Descartes not only main-
tains a distinction between the form and the content of objects, but
also privileges form over and against content. The form of extension
must be the real and unchanging essence of corporeal bodies, for this
21Descartes 1959, p. 102.
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property of being subsists throughout all changes, and is necessarily
self-sufficient.
Like the perspective of the Classical painters, from which it takes
its inspiration, Cartesian space is not given to embodied vision, but is
apprehended by thought. This is nowhere clearer than in the Carte-
sian reduction of the dimension of depth to the other two dimensions
of height and breadth. The Cartesian conception of space is a concep-
tion of extension (res extensa). Admittedly, Descartes includes depth
among the dimensions of extension. However, since extension itself
is defined as being constituted by points, each of which “is, and is
thought as being, right where it is?one here, another there” (EM, p.
134), extension is tantamount to height and breadth, which give them-
selves as a juxtaposition of simultaneous points. One might say that
such a definition is, as Descartes no doubt knew, self-evident and in-
dubitable, since both breadth and height belong to the object itself—
its geometrical properties—whilst depth clearly does not belong to
extended bodies themselves: it is the product of the observer’s acci-
dental solidarity with bodies by dint of his being embodied. Depth re-
veals itself only through the encroachment of things on one another
or upon themselves. Yet if things do encroach on one another, for the
Cartesian this is, on the one hand, only because ‘they are outside of
one another,’ and on the other hand because, for the sensible observer,
who is among them, the things in the foreground necessarily occlude
those behind. In this sense, depth is something of an illusion, a point
that is corroborated for Descartes by the ability of artists to recreate
the experience of depth in two dimensions with the technique of per-
spective drawing.
In this sense, “orientation, polarity, envelopment are, in space, de-
rived phenomena linked to my presence” (EM, p. 134). It is possible
to be deceived by these aspects of presence, and to attribute them to
things themselves; but grasped in “their positivity they are thoughts of
mine and not attributes of things” (EM, p. 134). Consequently, I know
that I see something in depth precisely because I am badly placed to
see it as it is in reality, and that someone else, positioned to the side of
me “or better, God, who is everywhere?could penetrate their hiding
11
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place and see them openly deployed” (EM, p. 134).
In essence, then, Descartes’ derivation of his conception of space
from the Renaissance artists provides him with a space over which an
unsituated thought ranges freely. Cartesian space is a space that is
surveyed by a thought from above, a thought that can determine the
body’s limited point of view upon things because it knows how that
body is itself situated among things. Thus Merleau-Ponty concludes:
The Cartesian situation is as follows. Everything we say
and think of vision has to make a thought of it. When,
for example, we wish to understand how we see the lo-
cation of objects, we have no other recourse than to sup-
pose the soul to be capable, knowing where the parts of
its body are, of ’transferring its attention from there’ to all
the points of space that lie along the prolongation of its
bodily members. (EM, p. 136)
The Cartesian conception of space, then, is the correlate of a vi-
sion that constructs what it sees?that is, a vision that sees in so far
as it thinks what it sees, and refuses to abandon itself to the specta-
cle as it offers itself up to perception. It presents us with a world that
thought can know, but to which it remains essentially indifferent, be-
cause it is uninvolved in it. In so far as the stuff of the world is reduced
by this concept of space tomere extension?itself conceived as partes
extra partes, as the simple externality of subsisting points?it offers us
aworld that is purged of all ambiguity because it is purged of any force,
resistance, or activity. Such aworld, reduced to extension, is aworld of
certainty, a world with which thought can reckon, calculate, or exert
its mathematical mastery over, insofar as it is essentially lifeless and
inert. In short, it is a world that, arrayed before thought, is prepared
for the grasp of the calculative rationality of the modern sciences that
“manipulate things and give up living in them [ . . . which make] con-
structs of things” and “whose fundamental bias is to treat everything
as though it were an object-in-general?as though itmeant nothing to
us and yet was predestined for our ingenious schemes” (EM, p. 121).
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3 Descartes and Vision
In this part of the essay I want to draw attention to howDescartes’
incorporation of perspectiva artificialis within his ontology finally
led him to re-appropriate actual vision according to the metaphor
of touch. For Descartes—or even the ‘philosophy of reflection’ in
general—the human reality of ‘being-in-the-world’ is conceived as
a compound phenomenon: a synthesis of categorially distinct ele-
ments, namely, body andmind. As a function of this compound, sense
perception is understood to be the product of an extrinsic interaction
between the two constitutively independent substances. Here, then,
sense experience (le Sentir) is conceived as that medium which ac-
complishes the subject’s primordial contact with the world. But, cru-
cially, this connection is not a lived or vital connection; rather, it is
envisaged as the product of a quasi-mechanical, passive interaction
between two discrete bodies.
As Merleau-Ponty acknowledges in Eye and Mind, this formula-
tion of sense experience (le Sentir) “is modeled after the sense of
touch” (EM, p. 131)—that is, an action by contact: a coinciding of
the phenomenal body with the world. However, such an appropria-
tion is contingent upon the view that the human body is ‘in’ the world
like an object; that is, the pre-condition of sense experience per se
is the ‘co-existence’ of the human body and the world. But further-
more, in order to articulate the condition of sense experience in terms
of ‘co-existence,’ the body itself must be apprehended as a thing in-
itself, present-at-hand within a ‘global locality.’ For Classical thought,
sense experience (le Sentir) is inert, and the perceiving body literally a
corpse that ismoved by themechanical action of external things upon
it. Both the spectacle and the spectator (kosmothereos), conceived as
external to one another, are thought in such a way that they are effec-
tively inanimate, lacking any vital significance.
Consequently, as Merleau-Ponty remarks, “here the body is no
longer the means of vision and touch, but their depository” (EM, p.
132). For Descartes, then, sense experience (le Sentir) is understood as
being occasioned ’within’ the body (res extensa). For it to be rendered
13
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intelligible—and thus perceptible—it must then be assimilated into
an order of thought, so as to be apperceived by the intellect (res cogi-
tans). Thus, asMerleau-Ponty explicates further, for the philosophy of
reflection, objects are not perceived as mediated through the senses;
rather themind itself constructs the visible as anorder of thought. The
body itself loses its primary ability and possibility, its actio in distans,
for it is this ability andpossibility that is nothingother than theground
of what Descartesmistakenly takes to be an attribute of themind—its
transcendence.
For Descartes, then, objects and ideas are not perceived through
the senses, but exist with the same necessity as the cogito—because
they are part of it. It is not the eyes that see, but the mind itself. And
if Descartes was able to claim this—if, that is, he was able to ground
philosophy in a self-sufficient ego, if he was able to give an account
of human transcendence by grounding it in this ego—it is because he
‘took inspiration’ from the techniques of the Renaissance. These tech-
niques, which I have already discussed, were able to construct a ‘true’
representation of the visible (or ‘external’ world) according to the in-
dubitable laws of geometry. However, and in exchange for this mas-
tery, the Renaissance theoreticians, and Descartes with them, were
obliged to subordinate aisthesis (the ‘content’ of the world) because
it did not directly pertain to the world according to geometry.
Merleau-Ponty does not claim, however, that the metaphor of
sight is unwarranted, that there is an ocularcentric bias to modernity,
and that, consequently, we should instead think in terms of a more
“tactile” or “corporeal,” that is to say, pragmatic relation to the world.
Rather, he suggests thatmodernity has always already determined the
very idea of sight, of seeing with the eyes, through the metaphor of
touch—by way, that is, of the Begriff. Thus Merleau-Ponty is here in
accord with Heidegger’s account of metaphysics as that way of think-
ing that is too abstract because it tries too hard to be concrete; as that
thinking that determines Being by way of its understanding of beings.
It is, then, the very prevalence of the metaphor of thought as vision
that hides the reduction of vision to the mastery of touch.22
22It isworth remembering, here, that inTheVisible andThe InvisibleMerleau-Ponty articulates a struc-
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Descartes’ fateful error, then, was not so much in taking inspira-
tion from the techniques of painting and drawing, but rather in to
treating these techniques as being absolute, as if they offered an unim-
peachable insight into the nature of vision. Descartes seeks to found a
science that forgets its origin in painting and drawing—Art—by sup-
pressing the intertwining of thought in sensuous experience. It is by
means of this suppression that Descartes is able to found a self that
experiences itself as a clear and distinct a priori, as the ground and
possibility of all meaning.
What Merleau-Ponty finds in modern philosophical thought—in
the “philosophy of reflection”—is the attempt to comprehend both
what the world is and our relation to it through the separation of aes-
thesis from noesis, eye from mind, and their reconciliation under the
rule of reason, so that what it represents is a theoretical appropria-
tion of our lived experience, a methodological reconstruction based
on, but disavowing, a “brute, existent world” (EM 160). For the philos-
ophy of reflection, our experience, our contact with the world, must,
and can only be presented as meaningful if it is rendered explicit and
unambiguous—if, that is, it is grasped in the form of a thought of the
world. That is to say the very possibility of meaning, the meaning
tural identity between touch and vision. What grounds this identification is the notion of reversibility:
the body’s ability to be at once touched and touching, seen and seeing. In the simplest terms, what this
analysis reveals is that the sensible is more fundamental than the division of res extensa and res cog-
itans (‘subject–object’ or ‘eye–mind’), and that the body cannot be contained within this conceptual
framework. Indeed, as Mark Hansen explains, the “body is the sensible itself—the sensible incarnated
as sensible, that is, beyond the distinction between sensing and sensed” (Hansen 2005, p. 247).
The notion of reversibility, though, it is most clearly demonstrated by the sense of touch, does not
impose a hierarchy upon the senses, or prove that the lived-body is constituted by tactile contact alone.
Instead, “we must habituate ourselves to think that every visible is cut out in the tangible, every tactile
being in somemanner promised to visibility, and that there is encroachment, infringement. [ . . . ] Since
the same body sees and touches, visible and tangible belong to the same world” (VI 134).
So far as I understand it, this position is not at odds with what Merleau-Ponty says about touch and
vision in Eye and Mind—quite the opposite. If, in Eye and Mind, Merleau-Ponty claims that the notion
of touch contaminates our understanding of vision, this is not to deny their relation, but to show how
Descartes, in his attempt to “know how [vision] happens” (EM 130), deploys a false analogy with the
haptic that mutilates or reifies the actual experience of seeing. While Descartes can situate the sense of
touch within the world (res extensa), he can only conceive of vision as taking place within the mind (res
cogitans).
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of meaning, has its condition in a thought in contact with itself, in
thought’s effort at an internal adequation.
Prior to this idea of thought in absolute possession of itself,
Merleau-Ponty recovers an inherence of thought in the sensible, and,
consequently, reconfigures the very meaning of aesthesis as such. The
movement or the method of Merleau-Ponty’s thinking is what he
terms hyperreflection; a thinking that does not reduce itself to a mere
consequence of, or simple effect of, a material given, as in the case of
empiricism, but which unearths the ground of thinking in its factual
enrootedness in the world. As Merleau-Ponty says, this hyperreflec-
tion is “what takes hold of me as I am in the act of forming the ideas of
subject and object, and brings to light the source of these two ideas: it
is reflection, not only in operation, but conscious of itself in operation”
(VI 219). Stated formally, hyperreflection represents the overcoming
of the aporias of the philosophy of reflection. Prima facie this move-
ment of thought would appear to closely resemble the Hegelian sub-
lation of the historical problems of transcendental philosophy. How-
ever, whereas Hegel overcomes the limitations of the Kantian critique
in attempting to ground thought in and from itself—that is, as an ab-
solutenoesis that recovers the aesthetic as but an alienatedmoment of
itself—Merleau-Ponty, on the other hand, recovers an originary inter-
twining of noesis in aisthesis, in, that is, a logos of the perceived world.
4 Conclusion: The Renewal of Philosophy
As I have tried to show here, the question of vision and of painting
is not merely brought forth in Eye and Mind as one example amongst
others of the subordination of aisthesis to noesis. Rather, it has a sin-
gular significance.
First, this question is the exemplary vehicle of this subordina-
tion in as much as it is the eidos, the outwardly visible aspect that a
thing offers to the eye, that becomes visible in the emphatic sense—
the idea—and which finally re-appropriates actual vision as a con-
fused version of itself, thus realising the independence of the world
of thought from the world of perception.
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Second, the determination of transcendence—the arête of the hu-
man being—by way of sight is valid in as much as it is the peculiar
virtue of vision to “to show more than itself” (EM, p. 178). Sight is
more than the passive reception of stimuli, of sensations, or data; it
points beyond itself and brings us into a relation with ‘external’ being;
it opens up a field of existence; it goes beyond the situation by means
of its capacity to express. As Merleau-Ponty writes, it is “capable of
leaping over distances, piercing into the perceptual future, and out-
lining hollows and reliefs, distances and deviations—a meaning—in
the inconceivable flatness of being [ . . . ] it possesses this world at a
distance rather than being possessed by it”.23
Thus by reflecting on the nature of sight, Merleau-Ponty shows
that modernity, which, with Kant, finally comes to determine the
essence of the human being on the ground of its spatio-temporal in-
tuition, had a certain validity insofar as it took inspiration from the
nature of sight. And yet, in the end, modernity itself denied what it
sought by reducing sight to a puremathematical intuition. It did this by
taking the perspectival techniques of the Renaissance as absolute—
that is, believing that perception must come about in the mind be-
cause the visible pertains to the laws of geometry. This domination
of the visible by the rational, or the determination of aisthesis by noe-
sis is reductive because it gives us the visible abstracted from a specific
point of view so as to arrive at a notion of theworldwhichwill be valid
for all—a particularity, then, that becomes absolute by forgetting its
origin in the flesh of the world.
If Dufrenne is unable to reconcile Eye and Mind with Merleau-
Ponty’s earlier texts, it is because, I think, he fails to grasp how Eye
and Mind is a return to and reformulation of the mind–body prob-
lem. This is necessary not merely in order to posit a possible solution,
but to appropriate the problem genealogically. Genealogy here is it-
self the explicitly philosophical response to the mind-body problem.
To believe that this problem can be solved in thought alone is itself
the consequence of the separation of mind and body. So far as I un-
derstand it, in Eye and Mind, what Merleau-Ponty tries to do is replay
23Merleau-Ponty 1964, p. 67.
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the foundational themes of modern philosophical thought, to grasp
their meaning, their motivation, and thereby destruct that thought’s
purchase on reality.
The Phenomenology of Perceptionwas already a destruction, a dis-
mantling of the modern philosophical tradition (of, that is, realism
and idealism). Yet it was naïve—or clumsy—to the extent that it was
not yet properly historical. The naivety of the Phenomenology of Per-
ception stems from its inability to see the productive forces—and the
horizon of understanding—at the inception of modern philosophical
thought. It is finally revealed, in Eye and Mind, that these are con-
tained in the perspectival techniques of the Renaissance artists and
theoreticians. Yet, if the Phenomenology of Perception is unable to see
this, it is because, asMerleau-Ponty himself articulates, it begins “from
the ‘consciousness’-‘object’ distinction” (VI 200) and not its historical
genesis. Despite this, we should not think that Eye and Mind repre-
sents an abandonment of the earlierwork; it gathers up, andpreserves,
the truth of what is expressed there, but on a deeper ontological reg-
ister. In any event, what secures their continuity is Merleau-Ponty’s
enduring critique of modern philosophical thought; a thought which
“manipulates things and gives up living in them” (EM 121); “a think-
ing which looks on from above” (EM 121); a philosophy that secured
human transcendence only by abstracting it from the world.
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